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Journalist's Privilege: When Deprivation
Is a Benefit
Gonzales v. NBC, 155 F.3d 618 (2d Cir. 1998)
Debate over the issue of a journalist's privilege not to disclose
information and source identities to the courts predates the United States
Constitution.1 Advocates for the privilege argue that the press's
responsibility to provide a check on the government justifies affording the
press certain privileges to fulfill that function.2 Yet one can accept that the
press is an important component of democracy and still reject an absolute
privilege for journalists' information.' Indeed, when the Second Circuit in
Gonzales v. NBC' deprived journalists of a privilege for nonconfidential
information, it set a precedent that will increase press independence from
the courts and will thus further, rather than frustrate, the press's
performance of its constitutionally delegated function.
Though the Supreme Court has never ruled on the issue of journalist's
privilege as it relates to nonconfidential information, related precedent
invited the Second Circuit to move the law5 in the direction of less
I. The common law according to Wigmore did not recognize ajournalist's privilege. Yet an
overwhelming number of courts have long relied on the common law as a source of the privilege.
Journalists have consistently asserted a privilege, and countless scholars have championed them.
Compare Timothy L. Alger, Comment, Promises Not To Be Kept: The Illusory Newsgatherer's
Privilege in California, 25 LOY. L. REV. 155, 169 (1991) (quoting Wigmore for the proposition
that there was no journalist's privilege at common law), and id. at 157-58 (offering examples of
courts that have grounded their recognition of a privilege in common law authorities), with Paul
Allee Curtis, Case Note & Comment, New Limits on Freedom of the Press, 34 IDAHO L. REV.
191, 193-94 (1997) (describing journalists' long struggle to assert a privilege). For an eloquent
discussion of the battle waged between journalists and jurists over the privilege, see Howard
Simons and Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Jurists and Journalists, in THE MEDIA AND THE LAW 2-3
(Howard Simons and Joseph A. Califano, Jr. eds., 1976).
2. See, e.g., Monica Langley & Lee Levine, Branzburg Revisited: Confidential Sources and
First Amendment Values, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 13 (1988) (encouraging more protection of
journalists' sources when reporting concerns the government); David Joseph Onorato, Note, A
Press Privilege for the Worst of Times, 75 GEO. L.J. 361 (1986) (advocating press freedom from
government interference).
3. In this Case Note, "information" and "communications" refer to material obtained from
sources as well as to identities of sources.
4. 155 F.3d 618 (2d Cir. 1998).
5. The Second Circuit has long been a leader in the area of press privileges. The circuit in
Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958), was the first to consider a privilege for a reporter's
promises of confidentiality. The Second Circuit also articulated the three-part test widely used by
those federal courts that extend a qualified privilege to journalists' information. See In re
Petroleum Prods., 680 F.2d 5, 7 (2d Cir. 1982).
1449
The Yale Law Journal
protection for journalists. In Branzburg v. Hayes,6 the Supreme Court
authority on press privileges, the Court refused to extend any privilege to
confidential information7 in criminal cases' and suggested in dicta that press
privileges are generally disfavored.9 Several subsequent federal court
decisions, however, evinced dissatisfaction with Branzburg's
implications;'0 the movement has been toward increased protection for
journalistic privileges." Gonzales signals a reversal of this trend.
I
Plaintiffs Albert and Mary Gonzales brought a civil rights action
against a Louisiana deputy sheriff whom they accused of stopping minority
citizens without probable cause and detaining and questioning them longer
than other citizens. The Gonzaleses sought production of nonconfidential,
unaired portions of a Dateline NBC program on law-enforcement abuses for
use in their civil suit. The video outtakes in question contained footage of
the deputy sheriff unlawfully searching a motorist. NBC contested the
subpoena, arguing that the tapes were privileged and that disclosure would
be unduly burdensome.12 The district court held that journalists enjoyed a
qualified privilege for nonconfidential as well as confidential information,
but that the plaintiffs' need in this case was sufficiently compelling to
override that privilege. 3
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the order directing production
of the tapes but held, contrary to the lower court, that journalists have no
privilege to avoid disclosing nonconfidential- information. 4 In the Second
Circuit after Gonzales, confidential communications remain subject to the
6. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
7. Information attains confidential status through an agreement between a journalist and a
source that communications or source identities exchanged in the course of their relationship will
not be disclosed. See generally John B. Kuhns, Note, Reporters and Their Sources: The
Constitutional Right to a Confidential Relationship, 80 YALE L.J. 317 (1970) (characterizing
confidentiality as a product of the particular relationship reporters and sources agree to establish).
8. Gonzales, and thus this Case Note, involve privilege solely in the context of civil cases.
9. 408 U.S. at 690-91 (declining to create for newsmen a privilege not held by other citizens
and criticizing the creation of new privileges).
10. See, e.g., Shoen v. Shoen, 48 F.3d 412, 414 (9th Cir. 1995) (asserting that Branzburg
should not be construed as a mandate for compelling disclosure of journalists' information); cases
cited infra note 17. The Second Circuit was in fact one of the trendsetters in broadening the
privilege after Branzburg. See Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778, 781,784 (2d Cir. 1972)
(proposing that Branzburg's holding is limited in scope and that application of a privilege is valid
in both the civil and criminal contexts).
11. State laws parallel this trend. In response to Branzburg, several state legislatures passed
shield laws extending protection to journalists. See Carl C. Monk, Evidentiary Privilege for
Journalists' Sources: Theory and Statutory Protection, 51 Mo. L. REv. 1, 25 (1986).
12. See Gonzales, 155 F.3d at 619-20.
13. See id. at 620-21.
14. See id. at 626.
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following three-part test: For the privilege to be denied, the information
sought must be highly material and relevant, necessary or critical to the
claim, and unobtainable from other sources."5  Nonconfidential
communications, by contrast, are governed by the ordinary rules of
discovery and receive no special privilege. 6 Neither the appellate court nor
the litigants recognized that this outcome benefited NBC as well as its
adversary. In retaining a qualified privilege for confidential but not for
nonconfidential information in civil cases, the court created distinct
standards for these two types of communications and thereby reduced the
risk of arbitrary judicial treatment of the press.
II
A number of courts outside the Second Circuit continue to extend a
qualified privilege to both confidential and nonconfidential information in
civil cases. 7 The use of the same standard for both confidential and
nonconfidential communications at worst conflates the two and at best
obscures the true bases for decision, rendering the outcomes of the
decisionmaking process unpredictable and ultimately imperiling reporter-
source relationships.
Most courts that extend a qualified privilege apply the same three-part
test to both confidential and nonconfidential information that the Second
Circuit now restricts to confidential information. Whether the information
in question is confidential is not a formal consideration in the current three-
part inquiry. Application of the standard to both types of communications
invites courts to set the same threshold of protection for both. The three-
part test is subjective: How "highly" material and how strictly "necessary"
the information in question must be will vary according to the strength of
the countervailing interest in protecting that information." The interest
should be greater when information is confidential and lower when it is not.
When the standard does not specify this, courts have license to fill the void
with their own subjective values, and they need not explain or justify their
choices. 9 Courts that favor less protection for journalists' materials are free
15. See In re Petroleum Prods., 680 F.2d 5, 7 (2d Cir. 1982).
16. See Gonzales, 155 F.3d at 627-28 ("The only question is whether the information is
relevant to the Gonzaleses' case and discovery should not otherwise be limited under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 26.").
17. Circuits that extend a qualified privilege include the Ninth and the Third. See Shoen v.
Shoen, 48 F.3d 412, 418 (9th Cir. 1995); U.S. v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 146-47 (3d Cir.
1980). For other courts that apply the privilege, see Alan S. Wasserstrom, Annotation, Reportorial
Privilege as to Nonconfidential News Information, 60 A.L.R. 5th 75, 120-21 (1998).
18. See Kuhns, supra note 7, at 340-41 (asserting that inquiries concerning relevance and
importance yield broad discretion to judges).
19. See generally DJ. GALUIGAN, DISCRETONARY PoWERs 31 (1986) (explaining that
where standards allow broad discretion, decisionmakers will be guided by their own values). Note
1999] 1451
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 108: 1449
to conflate the two types of information-as the standard invites them to
do-and afford confidential information as low a level of protection as they
afford nonconfidential information. Alternatively, courts that believe
journalists' communications should enjoy protection can impose a higher
threshold, even for nonconfidential communications, before the privilege
will be denied.2" Overbroad judicial discretion is an inevitable result of the
pre-Gonzales approach.2
The standard's lack of guidance has allowed judges to inconsistently
include or ignore the nature of the information in privilege analyses. When
the nature of the information is not a consistent and explicit factor in the
inquiry, parties cannot determine the factors influencing judges' decisions.
Where courts have explicitly considered whether the information is
confidential, they have failed to specify how much weight this factor
carries. The lower court in Gonzales, for example, mentioned in its holding
that the information at issue was not confidential, but did not explain what
role this fact played in the analysis.' Similarly, in Shoen v. Shoen, the
dissent pointed out that the absence of confidentiality had been a
consideration in a previous case, but that that factor was not viewed as
significant in the case at hand.' The court in United States v. Cutler,24 by
contrast, considered confidentiality in the course of applying the balancing
test. Yet when this element is not a formal part of the inquiry, litigants
cannot be sure whether these courts or others will make it a consideration in
any given case.'
that the problem of subjectivity, though it may be lessened, would nonetheless persist even if the
standard did direct judges to impose a somewhat higher threshold for confidential information
than for nonconfidential information. Questions of degree give rise to answers that are inherently
inexact. The most effective way to counter subjectivity is to draw a definite demarcation line
between the two types of information; creating an absolute standard for one type of information
accomplishes this. See infra Part I.
20. Extending protection to nonconfidential communications is difficult to justify as a policy
matter because such communications by definition are unaccompanied by expectations of
confidentiality. See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
21. Cf. Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844, 872-73
(1970) [hereinafter Overbreadth Doctrine] ("[Aid hoe standards of privilege infect[] the
judicial... factf'mding process, leaving the trier of fact to range at large in evaluating evidence
with little guidance as to the type and quantum of harm necessary to justify prohibition."). See
generally Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67,
88 (1960) [hereinafter Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine] (asserting that vague statutes give rise to
unbounded discretion of juries and judges).
22. Gonzales v. Pierce, 175 F.R.D. 57, 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
23. 48 F.3d 412, 419 (9th Cir. 1995).
24. 6 F.3d 67, 71 (2d Cir. 1993).
25. The likelihood is high that particular judges will implicitly evaluate whether or not the
communications are confidential; to ask judges to ignore the nature of the information-as the
pre-Gonzales approach does-runs counter to the more natural and doctrinally desirable
inclination to treat the two types of communications distinctly. See infra notes 33-34 and
accompanying text.
Some judges may decide to take the nature of the information into account out of an impulse
for fairness. Nonconfidentiality can weigh in favor of making information available to a litigant in
1452
Case Note
Whether judges set a single threshold or take the nature of the
information into account, the use of the same standard for both confidential
and nonconfidential information is a prescription for vagueness and
uncertainty. Overbroad or vague laws cause a chilling effect that threatens
the exercise of First Amendment rights.2 6 Vagueness breeds increased
litigation and unpredictable outcomes.' The risk of becoming embroiled in
litigation with uncertain results acts as a deterrent to the speech of both
journalists and their sources. 28
By facilitating arbitrary legal outcomes, the pre-Gonzales approach to
the journalist's privilege amounts to excessive interference with the
relationship between reporters and their sources and endangers the speech
to which that relationship gives rise. When protection or lack thereof is
uncertain, journalists and sources lose control over the information they
communicate. Cultivating clarity in the doctrine of privilege is the solution.
III
The Gonzales decision produces precisely the kind of clarity necessary
in journalist's privilege cases. By depriving nonconfidential materials of
protection while retaining a qualified privilege for confidential materials,
the Gonzales court ensured that confidential and nonconfidential
information would be treated distinctly. Courts that follow the Second
Circuit's approach need no longer struggle to find a single threshold that
will accommodate both nonconfidential and confidential information or
settle upon a threshold more suitable to one type of information. Gonzales
brings coherence to the interplay between the press and the judiciary.
dire need of it. If, however, the information is confidential, judges may be inclined to extend more
protection out of respect for journalist-source agreements.
26. See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (invalidating a vague statute
clause on the grounds that it allows punishment of protected speech); Overbreadth Doctrine,
supra note 21, at 853 (describing how a chilling effect results from overbroad and vague laws).
27. See Overbreadth Doctrine, supra note 21, at 868 (stating that overbroad or vague privilege
rules create uncertainty for litigants as to how particular claims will be adjudicated); id. at 871
(asserting that overbroad statutes, in failing to produce consistent outcomes, create a necessity to
litigate).
28. See Kuhns, supra note 7, at 340-41 (arguing that vague standards of privilege make it
difficult for journalists and sources to predict whether disclosure will be required). Sources will be
reluctant to communicate with journalists if they fear their confidentiality will be breached.
Reduced access to sources limits journalists' expressive freedom. See Alger, supra note 1, at 162
(asserting that alienating sources results in an inability to gather vital information); Kuhns, supra
note 7, at 336 ("Unless reporters and informers can predict with some certainty the likelihood that
newsmen will be required to disclose names or information.., there is a substantial possibility
that many reporters and informers will be reluctant to engage in such relationships."). The price
for maintaining access to sources can be high. Journalists who refuse to disclose information on
demand of the courts risk contempt citations and possible imprisonment. See Marcus A. Asner,
Note, Starting from Scratch: The First Amendment Reporter-Source Privilege and the Doctrine of
Incidental Restrictions, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 593, 596 (1993); Kuhns, supra note 7, at 332.
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Moreover, the use of two different standards clarifies the bases for
decisonmaking.
The press cannot be completely free from judicial intervention,29 yet
Gonzales minimizes press-judiciary interaction surrounding the press
privilege. By creating different standards for confidential and
nonconfidential information, the court created two distinct possibilities for
those jurisdictions that follow Gonzales. Journalists either will receive a
subpoena seeking the disclosure of confidential information, which may
ultimately receive protection, or they will be subpoenaed for
nonconfidential information, which will never be protected. The Gonzales
rule makes it clear to journalists that it is never worthwhile to contest a
subpoena for nonconfidential materials. The pre-Gonzales extension of a
qualified privilege to both confidential and nonconfidential information, by
contrast, meant that success in contesting a subpoena was always
theoretically possible, thus creating an incentive to litigate. After Gonzales,
journalists will know not to litigate a subpoena when the information at
issue is not confidential.
While confidential information is not subject to a standard as absolute
as that for nonconfidential information, the new approach will aid
journalists in determining whether even confidential information is likely to
receive protection. The elimination of covert bases for decisionmaking that
comes with a clearer standard will make journalists better informed about
the factors that have influenced judges in past cases, and it will aid them in
predicting the results of a potential suit contesting a particular subpoena.
Reporters will thus be better able to determine when to invest their
resources in litigation and when to simply comply with a discovery request.
In Gonzales, NBC argued that, absent the privilege, it would be deluged
with subpoenas for its information and forced to spend its resources in the
courtroom, rather than on the news beat.3" Actually, the court's decision
will allow the press to use its resources more sparingly and intelligently
than it could have when outcomes were less certain.3 ' NBC was ultimately
fortunate that its arguments did not persuade the court.
29. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682 (1972) ("It is clear that the First Amendment
does not invalidate every incidental burdening of the press that may result from the enforcement
of civil or criminal statutes of general applicability.").
30. 155 F.3d at 624. It is difficult to imagine how this particular ruling inconvenienced NBC
even in the short term. As the court pointed out, there was no expectation that the footage would
be kept confidential, and thus there was no danger of alienating any source. See Gonzales, 155
F.3d at 627. Moreover, the tapes were already in NBC's possession, so production did not require
any additional investment of reporting resources.
31. Clearer approaches deter litigation in a variety of legal contexts. See, e.g., John G.
Sprankling, An Environmental Critique of Adverse Possession, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 816, 878
(1994) (noting that bright-line tests deter litigation); Norbert F. Kugele, Note, How Much Does It
Take?: Copyrightability as a Minimum Standard for Determining Joint Authorship, 1991 U. ILL.
L. REV. 809, 833 ("If the courts were to announce a clear standard, parties could more easily
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IV
Journalists are typically interested in preserving another crucial
resource: their sources.32 The press-source relationship fuels the debate
about press privileges. A number of scholars assert that a failure to
privilege journalists' information places journalists at risk of alienating
their sources.33 Yet sources that do not insist upon confidentiality as a
condition of sharing information have no expectation of receiving
protection against disclosure.34 Nonetheless, even nonconfidential sources
likely would prefer that journalists' information not be delivered into the
hands of a litigating party.35 The Gonzales decision offers protection against
this contingency. The increased clarity achieved by the use of two distinct
standards serves a notice-giving function:36 Sources who fear being
embroiled in litigation will know not to expect any protection unless they
specifically invoke confidentiality in agreements with journalists. 37
predict the outcome of the litigation and thus make more intelligent decisions regarding whether
to proceed with a suit or not.").
32. See Langley & Levine, supra note 2, at 41 (documenting journalists' dependence on their
sources); Monk, supra note 11, at 6 (" mhe journalist's relationship with sources is critical to the
full and effective exercise of the profession.").
33. See, e.g., Monk, supra note 11, at 5 (postulating that journalists' relationships with
sources are harmed in the absence of a privilege).
34. The Gonzales court recognized this. See 155 F.3d at 627. It is worth noting that sources
that do not request confidentiality presumably cannot predict which components of their
information the press will decide to disseminate. Sources thus can have no reasonable expectation
that certain portions of that information will never be seen by the public and cannot object to
disclosure on these grounds.
35. Sources may fear being called as a witness in another's suit. Alternatively, information
could be sought for use in a suit against a source. Note that in Gonzales neither scenario could
have occurred, as the footage derived from mere observation of an event. However, situations that
would subject sources to a subpoena or to litigation are easy to imagine and probably more typical
than the situation in Gonzales. In Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), for
example, the plaintiffs alleged discrimination in real estate prices and sought disclosure of the
identity of a source who had informed a journalist that discriminatory action was occurring. In In
re Petroleum Products, 680 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1982), five states brought an antitrust suit against
several oil companies and sought a reporter's documents containing communications on oil prices.
36. Vagueness is the culprit in the denial of fair notice to potential parties. Clarity mitigates
this danger. See Overbreadth Doctrine, supra note 21, at 871-72; Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine,
supra note 21, at 86. In achieving clarity, therefore, Gonzales advances due process interests.
37. As a result, sources may invoke confidentiality more often. This is not necessarily a
negative outcome. If more information is confidential, a greater percentage of journalists'
information will be subject to a qualified privilege and journalists' information as a whole may
receive more protection. Though this may tend to insulate sources and their information from
public scrutiny for accuracy, the responsibility merely devolves upon journalists. As Kuhns notes,
"Since his professional success depends upon presenting fresh, important information to the
public, the reporter wil presumably act in a manner that will contribute to the full flow of
information." Kuhns, supra note 7, at 344. See also id. at 370 n.215 (asserting that journalists can
best ensure that adequate information reaches the public and that they should be the judges of
when information should remain confidential). Moreover, in the context of litigation, courts can
deny the privilege where a litigant's need outweighs a journalist's desire for confidentiality.
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Press-source agreements will be respected more often after Gonzales.
Nonconfidential information will not be privileged and confidential
information might be-an arrangement that more closely parallels
journalist-source intentions than does the pre-Gonzales framework.
Journalists and their sources either do not contemplate that information will
be kept in confidence-as is the case with nonconfidential information-or
they prefer that it not be disclosed-as is the case with confidential
information. Under the pre-Gonzales approach, neither of these outcomes
can be assured. Post-Gonzales, expectations for nonconfidential
information will be met, and confidential information will be automatically
eligible for more protection than nonconfidential information. While full
protection for confidential information is not guaranteed under either
approach, confidential information is more likely to be shielded from
disclosure after Gonzales, because such information can no longer be
conflated with nonconfidential information. Sources after Gonzales can rely
with more confidence on journalists' promises, and both journalists and
sources can be more certain that their expectations will be fulfilled.
The Gonzales court and NBC were engaged in an important and
principled struggle over First Amendment freedoms." The potential loss of
those freedoms is a troubling prospect, yet Gonzales's resolution rendered
that danger less imminent. Free speech rights repose more securely in clear
standards, and press-source relationships are strengthened when the results
of external interference with those relationships are less arbitrary. In
clarifying privilege analysis and increasing the predictability of legal
outcomes, Gonzales decreased the doctrine's potential to create ambiguity
and countered a threat to the free exercise of First Amendment rights.
Courts that follow Gonzales's lead will prove themselves guardians of
speech even as they forfeit some protection for that speech. As a result,
journalists can more freely fulfill their constitutionally significant function
of scrutinizing the branches of government.39 Gonzales ultimately facilitates
the press's performance of this duty by increasing press independence from
one of those branches-the judiciary.
-Julie M. Zampa
38. See Gonzales, 155 F.3d at 624 ("[W]e are still mindful of the preferred position which
the First Amendment occupies in the pantheon of freedoms." (quoting Baker, 470 F.2d at 783)).
39. See David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REv. 455, 460
(1983) (discussing the press's responsibility to counterbalance the three branches of government
by providing a check on official power).
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